It is commonly alleged that a substantial proportion of lawsuits are frivolous and are filed only for their nuisance value. This paper models settlement bargaining in the presence of frivolous suits as a game of asymmetric information, where the plaintiff knows the true merits of his claim, and the defendant does not, apart from any inferences he can draw from the fact of suit. When there is free entry to the opportunity to make a frivolous claim, the profit from doing so is driven to zero, and the surplus from settlement bargaining is completely dissipated. Several policies dealing with frivolous suits are examined; it turns out that requiring a losing litigant to pay the expenses of the winner (the English rule) does not alleviate the problem, but introducing a refundable deposit does.
Introduction

It is commonly alleged that
This article develops a model of litigation and settlement in the presence of frivolous suits, defined as those that have a sufficiently low chance of prevailing at trial that they would not be brought but for the prospect of settlement.
2
The model views the settlement process as an asymmetric information game. Specifically, the plaintiff knows the true merits of the claim, while the defendant must base decisions on an estimate of the proportion of legitimate suits in the population, updated by any inferences he can draw from the plaintiff's behavior. When there is free entry to the opportunity to bring a frivolous claim, in a sense to be defined below, the number of frivolous claims is strictly proportional to the number of genuine claims. And, among the properties of the resulting equilibrium is that frivolous suits completely dissipate the surplus from settlement bargaining.
Section 2 of the paper briefly surveys and critiques related work in the literature on litigation and settlement. Section 3 develops the basic model of the paper, solves for its equilibrium, and derives some results in comparative statics. Section 4 discusses the model's implications for a number of policy proposals for civil court procedure. Section 5 summarizes the analysis and suggests some possible extensions.
Related work on strike suits and settlement
The first formal analysis of frivolous suits was by Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) . They develop a full information model in which a frivolous plaintiff can obtain a positive settlement even though the defendant knows 2. The analysis here thus does not address the problem of suits in which the prospect of judicial error or confusion at trial permits a plaintiff to obtain a settlement which is undeserved according to some external objective standard. From the perspective of this paper, suits of the latter type are legitimate.
with certainty that the plaintiff would not go to trial. This result follows from the particular sequential structure of their model. First, the plaintiff decides whether to bring suit, which costs an amount c. Second, if suit is brought, the plaintiff chooses a settlement demand equal to S. Third, the defendant then decides whether to accept the settlement, to default and pay the alleged stakes A, or to defend the suit at a cost of k. Fourth and finally, if the defendant chooses to defend, the plaintiff chooses whether to drop the lawsuit or to litigate at a cost of t. The plaintiff has a probability w of winning the suit, so that his expected gains from going to trial are wA-t (where if wA-t is negative, the suit is denoted frivolous.)
The solution of the model is found by backwards programming. At the last stage, a frivolous plaintiff would withdraw, so that a defense results in payoffs (-c, -k) for plaintiff and defendant respectively. At the third stage, therefore, the defendant will accept a settlement S if and only if it is less than min [A, k].
The plaintiff thus chooses S in stage 2 so that it is infinitesimally less than min [A, k] . The payoff from bringing suit is
then (min [A, k] -c, -min [A, k]), and if defense costs and the alleged
stakes are both greater than the filing costs c, strike suits will be brought in equilibrium and will receive a positive settlement.
This result, however, depends critically on two particular assumptions of the Rosenberg/Shavell framework. First, they assume that the plaintiff rather than the defendant makes the settlement offer. In reality, a potential strike suitor is often a one-shot litigant, while the potential defendant is often a well-established person or business with incentives to establish a reputation. Such a defendant would seem more likely as the plaintiff to make a credible take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Second, the Rosenberg/Shave11 result depends upon the assumption that once suit has been brought, the defendant must spend the entire cost of a defense before the plaintiff faces the decision whether to continue. In reality, a defendant who knows the suit to be frivolous can respond by filing an answer consisting merely of a blanket denial of the plaintiff's allegations. This will suffice to avoid default, and the defendant can thereby shift the burden of the next expenditure to the plaintiff at little immediate cost. Since the plaintiff's ultimate threat to go to trial is not credible, the defendant may be able to ignore it. The reason that frivolous suits are not always met with blanket refusals to negotiate, of course, is that the defendant rarely knows the merits of the claim with certainty.
There has developed a substantial literature on litigation and settlement under imperfect information. Most of the contributors, however, have assumed the plaintiff's threat to go to trial to be credible, thus ruling out the possibility of strike suits. In contrast, a recent working paper by Bebchuk (1987) Suppose that some event occurs that enables a plaintiff plausibly to claim an entitlement to legal compensation. Assume that the potential 3. Several other articles shed light on various features of suits 'by plaintiffs who might not go to trial. Ordover and Rubenstein (1986) analyze a bargaining game which can be reinterpreted as a model of strike suits. They assume that the only way the suit can end is for one of the parties to give up, however, and are primarily interested in explaining the duration of a variable bargaining period. P'ng (1983) considers the possibility that the plaintiff would not go to trial, in a model in which an informed defendant chooses whether to offer an exogenous settlement to an uninformed plaintiff. It is difficult to describe P'ng's plaintiff as a strike suitor, however, since like Nalebuff's he does not know whether his case is a winner. Salant (1984) develops an model of litigation in which an informed plaintiff has already filed suit at the outset and is about to make an offer to an uninformed defendant. Although Salant does not explicitly consider the issue of strike suits, the approach is sufficiently general that a reinterpretation of the notation could yield some insights about the issue. He is concerned primarily, however, with the information transmitted by the amount of the settlement offer. plaintiff knows with certainty whether he is actually injured. The defendant, in contrast, knows only the probability of compensable injury conditional on the initial event. To illustrate, consider a customer at a retail store who slips and falls on a wet floor that the store negligently failed to keep dry.
The customer knows the true extent of his injury, but the store only knows that such falls result in injury a certain proportion of the time. A second illustration would be a products liability case in which the fact of injury is undisputed, but the plaintiff is not entitled to damages if he was contributorily negligent in using the product. The plaintiff knows whether he was negligent, but the defendant cannot know without a trial.
The litigation process of our model occurs in four stages. First, an injury either occurs or does not occur. Second, the plaintiff makes the decision whether or not to sue; this depends on both the expected settlement and the plaintiff's expected gains from trial should there be no settlement.
Third, the defendant chooses a single take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer.
Fourth, the plaintiff chooses whether to accept the offer, and if the offer is nonpositive, whether to drop the case or to proceed to trial. At trial the plaintiff's information is revealed, and judgment may be given for an injured plaintiff. The structure of the settlement game is shown in extensive form in The preliminaries aside, suppose for that plaintiffs are either injured or not, with the prior probability of injury denoted as p e [0,1].
The extent of injury is denoted as A and the likelihood of a finding of liability given that there is injury is denoted as w e [0,1]; the expected award at trial for an injured plaintiff then equals wA.
The cost of trial if no settlement is reached is denoted as t for the plaintiff and as k for the defendant. In addition, a plaintiff must initially spend c to bring the lawsuit; this includes the costs of preparing and filing a complaint and making the fact of the lawsuit known to the defendant. Once suit has been brought, this cost is sunk and does not affect the decision to proceed to trial. The net expected gains for an injured plaintiff from trial,
given that suit has been brought, then equals wA -t; the expected cost for the defendant when the injured plaintiff goes to trial is wA +k.
4. The defendant may also have costs prior to trial. Such costs are sunk by the time of settlement and hence do not affect the optimal settlement strategy, so I ignore them. In a model analyzing frivolous defenses as well gains from trial, wA-t. 5 Note that the initial complaint cost has no effect (continued) as frivolous claims, such costs might become an important factor.
5. 1 assume without loss of generality that an injured plaintiff will always accept a settlement offer when indifferent.
on the decision to accept settlement. This is because that cost is sunk once the plaintiff brings suit.
Now when the defendant chooses S, he does not know which type of
plaintiff he faces.
The optimal S then depends upon his estimate of the probability that the plaintiff is injured. The defendant knows a genuinely injured plaintiff will always sue, because the net payoff from suit to such a plaintiff is the greater of s-c or wA-t-c; and I have assumed that wA-t-c is strictly positive.6 Denote as q the probability that an uninjured plaintiff brings suit, and denote as r the defendant's posterior probability estimate that the plaintiff is injured. According to Bayes' rule:
The value of r ranges from l to p as q ranges from 0 to 1.
The defendant's choice of S is simplified by observing that he should
never make an offer other than S 0 or S = wA-t. To see this, note that for S e [wA-t, QJ, both injured and frivolous plaintiffs will always accept the offer. The defendant's expected payout is therefore equal to S, which is minimized in the interval at wA-t, For S s [0, wA-t), frivolous plaintiffs accept the offer and injured plaintiffs prefer to go to trial. The defendant's expected payout is then equal to (1-r)S + r(wA+k), which is minimized in the interval at S=Q. The intuition is that so long as the set of plaintiffs who accept the offer is unchanged, the defendant wants to make the 6. This assumption is essential to the formulation of the problem. If wA-tc, then in equilibrium neither frivolous nor injured plaintiffs will bring suit. 
wA-t
If a > a*, a potential frivolous plaintiff, will always bring suit. If a <ua, no frivolous plaintiffs will-bring suit. And, if a = a*, frivolous plaatitffs will be idnfiffereit and will -enter with se probability q e [0, 1] .
There are two possible types of equilibrium. Which type obtains depends upon whether the prior probability of injury p is greater or less than the threshold conditional probability r*.
It p > r*, then all plaintiffs will bring suit and all suits will result in settlement. This is because the defendant strictly prefers to offer S=wA-t, io matter the value of q, buying off all strike suitors. Potential strike suitors will then anticipate a positive return of wA-t-t from suit, so they will all sue. In sim:
Proposition 1: It the prior probability of injury is above a threshold level, the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium involves all potential plaintiffs bringing suit, whether injured or not, and all suits resulting in settlement.
In this first type of equilibrium, the prior probability of injury is so high that the defendant wants to settle with all the strike suitors in order to avoid having to go to trial against the injured plaintiffs. In all such equilibria, q-1 and r=r*: if q were less than 1, the defendant would strictly prefer g=1, leading all potential plaintiffs to enter. If c were less than u*, only the injured would sue, again leading the defendant to prefer a21.
8. This is the special case identified by Bebdhuk (1987) . In his model, the degree of injury varies over a continuum, so that some injured plaintiffs reject the offer S and go to trial in equilibrium. For a more general analysis of the variable-injury model, see my 1986 dissertation.
To get a sense of the importance of this type of equilibrium, it is helpful to calculate the typical value of the threshold r*.
The findings of the University of Wisconsin Civil Litigation Research Project, which provide the best available data on litigation expenditure, indicate that the total trial costs in a typical lawsuit range from one-fourth to one-half of the potential stakes A. Denoting the ratio of total trial costs to the potential stakes as v = (t+k)/A, and assuming that t and k are approximately equal: For example, when an injured plaintiff is certain to win and where total costs are one-third the potential stakes, r*=O.71.
Observe that the threshold rises with the probability of liability w and moves inversely to the stakes-cost ratio. Thus, a restricted entry equilibrium is more likely when the cost of trial is high relative to the expected stakes. But for plausible parameter values, the prior probability of injury must be substantially above 50% to support a restricted entry equilibrium.
The value of p will in general depend upon the specificity and exclusiveness of the initial event, as well as upon any additional information the defendant obtains through investigation. If the defendant is unable to identify the occurrence of the initial event or the class of persons who may have participated in it, the value of p will be small. To illustrate, in the slip and fall case, the set of potential plaintiffe may be limited to those who actually fall, and p will represent the probability that such persons are Table 1 Simulation of value of threshold r* represent the prior probability of the compound event that a fall occurred and that it resulted in injury. The more difficulty the defendant has in defining the initial event, the less likely is a restricted entry equilibrium.
When p is less than the threshold r*, the nature of the outcome is quite different. In equilibrium, the posterior probability r must exactly equal r* . If instead r>r*, the defendant's best response is cr=1, but then additional frivolous plaintiffs would wish to enter. Similarly, if r<r*, the defendant's best response is a=O, but then no strike suitors would enter. A similar argument shows that the equilibrium probability of settlement a must be equal to a*. This implies:
Proposition 2: If the prior probability of injury is below a threshold level, there is a unique equilibrium such that:
All genuinely injured plaintiffs bring suit;
ii) 'Some frivolous lawsuits are brought, but not all potential strike suitors bring suit; iii) Some strike suitors receive positive settlements while others drop their suits, and some injured plaintiffs fail to receive any settlement and consequently go to trial.
In this second type of equilibrium, competition among strike suitors reduces the profits from bringing a strike suit to zero. I refer to this outcome as free entry equilibrium. It is the more interesting and realistic case, and the major part of the discussion is devoted to its analysis. Table 1 When there is free entry, p and c do not appear in the expression for f or r*. When entry is restricted, f equals 1-p. Inspection also reveals:
The entries of
In restricted entry equilibrium, the proportion of lawsuits that are frivolous is invariant to all parameters except the prior probability that an injury occurred; and increases directly as the prior probability decreases.
Proposition 5: A restricted entry equilibrium is more likely to obtain when (1) the prior probability of injury is higher; (2) the defendant's trial costs are higher; (3) the trial costs of an injured plaintiff are higher; (4) the expected or potential stakes are lower.
One surprising aspect of Proposition 3 is that in free entry equilibrium, we can expect the same fraction of suits to be frivolous in a freak accident case as in a common slip and fall, so long as the amount of damages and the costs of the trial are the same. Equivalently, the number of frivolous lawsuits, (1-p)q, is strictly proportional to the prior probability p. The intuition is that it is just this proportion that makes a defendant indifferent between settling and going to trial.
As p continues to rise, of course, it will eventually reach r*, and the equilibrium will switch to restricted entry. In the case of restricted entry, an increase in p leads directly to a decrease in the proportion of frivolous suits. This follows trivially from the fact that all potential plaintiffs, frivolous and genuine, are bringing suit.
Next, it is also apparent that the cost of initiating suit, c, does not affect the number or proportion of frivolous suits, nor does it affect which type of equilibrium obtains. While changes in the entry cost do have effects in equilibrium, such effects are entirely concentrated on the frequency of settlement. This is because when the genuinely injured plaintiff's return from suit is positive, it always pays strike suitors to enter until r reaches the level where the defendant is indifferent between settlement and trial. This result is perhaps surprising; it implies that policies that aim to discourage strike suits by increasing the complaint costs will not work.
More accurately, they will not work so long as c is kept below wA-t. Raising c above wA-t will discourage strike suits, but only at the cost of discouraging meritorious suits as well.
The effect of an increase in the defendant's trial costs, k, is to increase the relative frequency of strike suits. Thus, the popular claims that strike suits are an especially severe problem in the fields of antitrust and medical malpractice may be explained by the complexity and high costs of mounting a defense to such claims. The intuition here is similar to the argument of Rosenberg and Shavell. Larger defense costs make trial more unattractive for the defendant and increase his willingness to settle; accordingly, more strike suitors enter. In the Rosenberg-Shavell model, however, high defense costs make a defendant more willing to accept a settlement offer from a plaintiff whom he knows to be frivolous. Here, where it is the defendant who makes the settlement offer, high defense costs make a settling defendant willing to tolerate a higher proportion of strike suitors.
An increase in the trial costs of an injured plaintiff, t, also
increases the relative frequency of strike suits in free entry equilibrium.
Thus, the alleged prevalence of strike suits in antitrust and medical malpractice may also be explained by high plaintiff's costs in such suits; similar reasons may also explain assertions that strike suits are common in the areas of securities law and products liability, and for class actions generally. The reasoning underlying this result is somewhat more complicated: higher plaintiff's trial costs imply that the amount needed to induce a genuinely injured plaintiff to settle is reduced. The defendant will therefore be more willing to settle and will tolerate a higher proportion of frivolous suits in order to do so. Indeed, by a similar argument one may see that any policy that reduces a genuinely injured plaintiff's return from trial will increase the frequency of strike suits.
Finally, an increase in the expected judgment will reduce the frequency of frivolous lawsuits. This is because an increase in the stakes reduces the relative importance of the trial costs? and it is the relative costs of trial that determine the frequency of strike suits. The defendant will thus be more willing to risk the defense costs at trial, and will tolerate fewer frivolous suitors in equilibrium.* This result has at least Proposition6 : In free entry equilibrium, the proportion of lawsuits that settle: (a) is invariant to the prior probability that an injury occurred;
9. This argument, as well as the mathematical derivations, is based on a partial derivative analysis and assumes that as the expected judgment rises the costs of trial will be unchanged.
In general, parties will find it worthwhile to increase trial expenditures in cases with higher stakes.
Whether an increase in the expected judgment will increase or reduce the frequency of frivolous suits depends on the elasticity of expenditure with respect to the expected stakes. If, for instance, expenditure is exactly proportional to the stakes (the case of unit elasticity), a change in the expected judgment will have no effect on the equilibrium proportion of frivolous suits. If trial expenditure is inelastic with respect to the stakes, however, as the CLRP evidence suggests, the result in the text and its underlying reasoning are still valid. (e) increases with the cost of filing a lawsuit.
Proof: By differentiation of equation (4). The underlying intuition is that the equilibrium settlement frequency must leave the marginal frivolous plaintiff indifferent whether to bring suit. A marginal increase in the initial cost c, then, will make suit less attractive, requiring an increase in the frequency of settlement. Note that if c=0, so that it costs nothing to bring suit, strike suitors will prevent all settlement, forcing all genuinely injured plaintiffs to trial. This does not make the injured plaintiffs worse off, however, because the defendant gets all the gains from bargaining by virtue of his ability to make the offer.
An increase in the trial cost of a genuine plaintiff will also make suit less attractive by reducing the settlement level. Therefore it also requires an increase in the equilibrium settlement frequency. An increase in the expected award makes suit more attractive and decreases the equilibrium settlement frequency; this result is consistent with a number of other models of settlement.
Now from a social welfare standpoint, we care not about the frequency of suits or of settlement, but about total legal expenditure. This total cost, denoted as L, is the sum of total initial costs and total expenditure on trials. We should also care how changes in the parameters or in legal rules affect the welfare of the various parties. Payments received by legitimate plaintiffs reflect the system's effectiveness in achieving compensation for injury; while payments made by defendants reflect the level of deterrence 
= -
wA-t wA-t 1-f
The total number of cases going to trial is Nt = p(1-0) , or:
Since the social cost of a suit is c and the social cost of a trial is (t+k), the total social loss from litigation is:
[ wA+k wA-t-c (9) f = pc wAt
Equation (9) This implies it would not be desirable to increase the initial cost c, even though doing so would increase the frequency of settlement. The extra costs incurred per suit would more than outweigh the decrease in trials, so that total litigation costs would increase. Moreover, all the increased cost would be concentrated on injured plaintiffs, undercutting the goal of compensation.
Increasing trial costs for the plaintiff would similarly increase total cost while undercutting compensation; an increase in defense costs would also increase total costs but would at least raise the deterrent value of litigation. In sum:
In free entry equilibrium, the social cost of litigation would be increased by an increase in either entry costs or trial costs. Social welfare would be unaffected if settlement were forbidden.
Applications to policy issues in civil procedure
This section applies the foregoing analysis to a number of policies (continued) the same initial cost in bringing suit; i.e., that rent-seeking is perfectly competitive. If potential plaintiffs differed in their values of c, those with lower c would earn positive rents in equilibrium, and not all the gains from bargaining would be dissipated. In the general case, then, forbidding settlement could still decrease social welfare.
that have been proposed to deal with the strike suit phenomenon.
Stricter proof and pleading requirements
Some analysts have favored stricter pleading and proof requirements on the grounds that they will raise the cost of bringing suits and thereby improve their average merit.
To model this, suppose plaintiffs were required to engage in a higher degree of preparation before initiating a suit. For genuine plaintiffs, this would reduce the amount of preparation needed at trial, and so would not necessarily mean a change in the total costs of litigation. In our notation, c would be increased and t reduced by an equivalent amount; the total plaintiff's costs, t+c, would be unchanged. The increase in c would not affect the equilibrium frequency of strike suits, and the decrease in t would decrease the frequency of strike suits; the net result would be a reduction in strike suits.
To consider the effect on the equilibrium settlement frequency, define the variable z as the amount of trial cost that is shifted to initial cost by the stricter requirements. The initial entry cost is c+z while the plaintiff's trial cost becomes t-z. The settlement frequency is then: c+z (4') a =
wA-t+z
Differentiating, we find 8u/6z > 0, so that settlement becomes more frequent as the initial cost increases proportionately miore, than the settlement offer.
Despite this, equation (9) shows a stricter pleading rule would have no net effect on social welfare. While it would reduce both the number of strike suits and the number of trials, it would increase costs incurred in those 24 lawsuits which settle. This last effect precisely balances the first two.
Furthermore, the welfare of each type of litigant would be unchanged, so there would be no net effect on compensation or deterrence.
English rule of litigation finance
Some legal writers have recommended that we adopt the English rule of cost allocation, under which the losing party must indemnify the winner for With this notation, an injured plaintiff would expect to gain wA-t+bu at trial, and a defendant would expect to pay wA+k+bu if brought to trial by an injured plaintiff. The initial cost of bringing suit is still equal to c.
By the same reasoning as section 3.2 above, the equilibrium proportion of frivolous suits is:
The equilibrium frequency of settlement is:
11. I assume that the adoption of the English rule will not affect the genuine plaintiff's decision whether to sue. As Shavel1 (1982) has demonstrated, for suitable parameter values the English rule can deter some genuine claims that the American rule would have encouraged. On the other hand, if the defendant's costs are small relative to those of the plaintiff, or if total costs are large relative to the stakes, the English rule can encourage some genuine claims that the American rule would have deterred. Since I am primarily concerned here with the effect of the English rule on frivolous suits, I abstract from such effects. What is the effect of the English rule on social welfare? The number of suits is still NS = p/(1-f), and the number of trials is still Nt = p(1-a).
The total social cost, L, then equals cN + (t+k)Nt, or:
So total social cost is unaffected by the choice of financing rule;
the effects on the number of suits and on the number of trials cancel out.
The underlying reasoning is that strike suitors will enter until all the gains from bargaining have been dissipated.
The financing rule can, however, affect the welfare of the individual parties. The expected profits of injured plaintiffs are wA-t-bu, and the expected losses of defendants are wA+k+bu. The English rule redistributes income between defendants and injured plaintiffs depending on the sign of u.
If u>0, a shift to the English rule will benefit injured plaintiffs and hurt defendants.
In sum:
Proposition 8: A shift toward the English rule of litigation finance will increase the welfare of an injured plaintiff if and only if his probability of winning at trial is above a certain, threshold. The level of the threshold varies directly with the size of the defendant's legal costs, and varies inversely with the size of the plaintiff 's legal costs.
Proposition 9: In free entry equilibrium, a shift toward the English rule of litigation finance will: Indeed, the problem is not one of an inability to collect defense costs from strike suitors; since they never go to trial, there are no defense costs in their cases. The externality arising from strike suits, rather, is that they interfere with the settlement of genuine claims. They cause both defendants and injured plaintiffs to incur increased trial costs in other cases. A simple indemnification remedy, therefore, does not work to remove the externality.
Refundable deposits
Now consider a rule which requires all plaintiffs to file a deposit upon bringing suit. The deposit is refundable if and only if the plaintiff's injury is established at trial or if the defendant consents to its return through a settlement. Otherwise, the deposit is paid into the court system. 12 12. A deposit payable to the defendant works similarly.
Assume that even if a genuine plaintiff can lose, the good faith nature of his claim can be established at trial, entitling him to the return of his deposit.
Denote the amount of the deposit as D. At the last stage before trial, a genuine plaintiff stands to gain either wA-t+D from going to trial or S+D from accepting settlement. He will accept settlement if and only if S > wA-t, just as before. For a frivolous plaintiff, in contrast, the deposit allows the defendant to capture some rents. At the last stage, a strike suitor can gain -t by going to trial, can gain zero by dropping the suit, or can gain S+D by accepting the settlement offer.
It follows that he will pay up to the amount of the deposit in order to settle.
An offer of wA-t will be accepted by all plaintiffs; an offer of -D Now a potential strike suitor will erter if and only if a(wA-t+D) > c+D. The equilibrium settlement probability therefore equals: c+D (16) a* wA-t+D A higher deposit increases the settlement probability, reducing the frequency of trials. It does so by increasing the ratio of entry cost to potential settlement, making strike suits less attractive. A higher probability of settlement can thus be sustained in equilibrium.
Finally, the number of suits is equal to NS = p/r, and the number of trials is NS = p(1-a). So total litigation costs are:
The deposit scheme improves social welfare. Moreover, the higher the deposit the better. As D approaches infinity, o and r approach 1 and L approaches pc. A sufficiently large deposit allows us to come arbitrarily close to the first-best outcome, in which only injured plaintiffs bring suit and all suits are settled.
In theory, perfect capital markets would lend an injured plaintiff the amount of any deposit. In practice, plaintiffs will be liquidity constrained.
The most obvious defect in the capital market is that lenders would find it at least as difficult as the defendant to tell genuine from frivolous plaintiffs.
If borrowing is difficult, a deposit may deter genuine plaintiffs from suit.
If the assets of injured plaintiffs place an upper limit on the feasible deposit, the first-best outcome cannot be reached. The model suggests,
however, that the deposit should be as large as can feasibly be required.
Taxes and subsidies
The equilibrium is inefficient because externalities arise from the While the contingent fee has been criticized for its supposed contribution to the increase in litigation, the true story may be more complicated. The fact that an attorney is willing to take a percentage of a case as his compensation may be a good signal that the case has merit; accordingly, contingent fees may help to channel meritorious cases toward settlement, while screening out some frivolous claims.
13
In summary, the reality of the court system is complex, and our results and recommendations should be taken as tentative. On the other hand, recent critics of the American civil litigation system have been quite willing to make their own recommendations for its reform on efficiency grounds. Our results also suggest that we should be even more cautious in applying "common sense" prescriptions for the judicial process which are not carefully based on an explicit theoretical model. This paper is intended as a step toward that goal.
13.
In a prominent dissent based on this conjecture, Judge Richard
Posner argued for the denial of state-appointed counsel to an indigent prisoner who wished to bring a civil suit against the prison physician for medical malpractice, on the grounds that the suit would have been accepted by a private attorney on a contingent fee basis had it been meritorious. See Merritt v. Faulkner (1983), 697 F.2d 761. For G and r near zero, the right-hand side of (A8) is positive and the right-hand -side of (A12) is negative, confirming the comparative statics results of the constant-cost model in the text.
